It is About Credit Markets, Not Just Stimulus
Washington has kicked off a perfectly predictable donnybrook over stimulus. Democrats, who spent the past eight years bashing George Bush for turning a Clinton-era surplus into a big deficit, are now defending what will be nearly $1 trillion in new tax cuts and spending. Republicans, who presided over decades of deficits, suddenly are worried about the debt we are leaving to our grandchildren.
Yet, this entire squabble may be missing the point. If Washington is going to help dig the economy out of its very deep hole, it must do more than just stimulate demand. It must also restore the health of the credit markets.
That is not to say that designing a good stimulus bill is not important. It is. But we need to recognize the limits of what all this government spending and tax cutting can do.
For now, Washington is falling back on recipes that have been tried many times before with only limited success. On the tax side, proposals such as allowing businesses to write-off capital costs more quickly, or giving cash payments to workers, have been tried repeatedly in past recessions. As a new TPC report card shows, there are no magic bullets here. While some pieces of the tax stimulus working its way through Congress will be better than others at jump-starting the economy, none will have a major impact.
The same goes for spending. A new CBO report concludes it will take years for the proposed new outlays to work through the economy. For instance, CBO figures only about one-third of $30 billion in proposed highway money could be spent within the next 20 months.
My sense is that, at best, the stimulus package will keep things from getting worse. Necessary, as they say, but not sufficient for recovery. The IMF recently published an interesting paper that noted the importance of both stimulus and credit market reform, even as it called for massive efforts to boost demand. Christy Romer, a key adviser to President Obama and a highly respected economic historian, has argued that New Deal fiscal policy did almost nothing to end the Great Depression.
Think of stimulus as a life preserver. It may keep the economy from drowning, but won’t do much to get us back on a course of sustained economic growth.
It will be up to the Fed and the much-maligned TARP (and its costly progeny) to accomplish that. The problem, of course, is that when it comes to fixing the credit markets, we are sailing in unchartered waters. Do we create a “bad bank” that will offload toxic loans from troubled financial institutions? Do we nationalize some brand-name banks? In desperation, we find ourselves looking to the experiences of Sweden or Japan for answers that are not obvious.
After a lot of arguing, we’ll enact a nearly $1 trillion stimulus. It will help, though much of the money will inevitably be wasted. But keep your eyes on what the Fed and the Obama Administration do to get the credit markets working again. That, more than tax cuts and spending, will be key to how quickly the economy gets back on track.
Great Expectations
I’ve been reading up on the Great Depression (never say those of us at TPC don’t know how to have fun) and am struck by one overriding thought: Even with the benefit of 80 years of hindsight, economists still can’t agree on either what went wrong or how the economy got back on track.
There is an important lesson here. Famously impatient, Americans not only expect government to fix today’s economic crisis, they demand it. Barack Obama, I suspect, will have about a year to turn things around before the public turns on him. Yet, if we still don’t know what happened in 1929, how can we expect policymakers to truly understand—and correctly address—events happening in real time today?
Here is the dirty little secret: Obama doesn’t know how to fix the recession. Nobody does. It is easy (though wrong) to say Herbert Hoover failed to grasp the enormity of the Depression. But in truth, FDR had little better idea of how to respond to the crumbling economy. In fact, Roosevelt was famous for trying one solution after another until something seemed to work.
There is broad agreement on what government should not do, such as run a tight monetary policy or restrict trade. But there is much less consensus on what it should do. How much will pulling fiscal levers boost demand? Is massive new government spending really such a good idea? Will tax cuts get people and businesses spending again?
When credit markets collapsed earlier this year, George Bush turned to his group of wise men for advice. They included Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke, a highly-regarded student of the Depression. President-elect Obama has now chosen his team, including Christy Romer, another expert on that era. They are very smart, and have access to far better data than their counterparts had in the 30s.
But today’s data are not that good. And there is no magic bullet. For instance, Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson has been roundly criticized for his on-again-off-again use of the TARP. First, he insisted on using the $700 billion to acquire bad assets, then he decided to pump liquidity into financial institutions, and now he is giving $13 billion to the auto companies. This seems incoherent because it is. But trial-and-error is as inevitable in economics as in medicine—another field based more on art than science.
Obama’s stimulus plan, which by some accounts will cost $850 billion or more, will include its share of bad ideas. Some initiatives may at first seem to make perfect sense but will inevitably have dreadful unintended consequences. And there will be good ideas that should be in the plan but fail to make the cut.
Those of us who kibbitz from the sidelines will identify mistakes and demand better alternatives. But we should have no illusions. Getting a huge, complex, and still poorly understood economy back on track is not going to be simple and it will take time. Obama, despite the stratospheric expectations he’s raised, is going to make errors. We will, and should, call him on those poor choices. But we’d be fools to expect perfect diagnosis and treatment from the incoming Administration.