Chabad of Randolph – Affirmed
This matter started on October 1, 2005, after the defendant, the Township of Randolph, denied the plaintiff, the Chabad of Randolph, a parsonage exemption for the residence occupied by the plaintiff’s rabbi. The defendant denied plaintiff’s application due to alleged zoning violations and the belief that the plaintiff did not otherwise qualify for a parsonage exemption.
Subsequently, on appeal, the County Tax Board affirmed the defendant’s decision to deny the plaintiff’s parsonage exemption.
Afterwards, the plaintiff then appealed to the Tax Court of New Jersey where the Tax Court reversed the County Tax Board’s decision. At trial, the Tax Court judge concluded that the plaintiff carried its burden of proving that the rabbi’s Chabad-owned residence was entitled to a parsonage exemption under N.J.S.A. 54:4-3.6, which exempts from taxation “the buildings, not exceeding two, actually occupied as a parsonage by the officiating clergymen of any religious corporation of this State.”
The defendant then appealed the Tax Court’s decision to the Appellate Division. On appeal, the Appellate Division agreed with the Tax Court entirely and held that: “The evidence overwhelmingly supports the conclusion that his residence is a ‘parsonage’ within the meaning of N.J.S.A. 54:4-3.6.” As a result, the plaintiff will not have to pay any property taxes for the property used by the plaintiff’s rabbi as his residence.
To read the full Appellate Division decision, please click the words Property Tax Appeals.
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Tax Exempt Day-Care Facility
This Blog/Web Site is made available for educational purposes only general understanding of the law, not to provide specific legal advice. By using this blog site you understand that there is no attorney client relationship between you and the Blog/Web Site publisher.
Rosen v. Plainsboro Township
(i) Assessment maintenance: An assessor proposing to revise and update assessments because he or she has reason to believe that property comprising a part of a taxing district has been assessed at a value lower or higher than is consistent with the purpose of securing uniform taxable valuation of property according to law for the purpose of taxation, or is not in substantial compliance with the law, and that the interests of the public will be promoted by reassessment of such property, shall make a reassessment of the property in the taxing district not in substantial compliance….
3. The following are the criteria to be considered by the county board and Division of Taxation in determining whether to approve a compliance plan.
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(viii) Assessed value changes due to clerical, typographical, transpositional, physical descriptive or mathematical errors, added assessments, omitted assessments, omitted added assessments, exemptions, demolitions, governmentally imposed restrictions, planning board, and/or zoning board of adjustment approvals, approved revaluations, site contamination, removal of contaminated soil and property remediation; and storm, cyclone, tornado, earthquake, fire, flood, hurricane, vandalism, or other casualty, qualified farmland, subdivisions, mergers and changes resulting from appeals or settlement agreements, do not require the filing of a compliance plan.
The Plaintiffs argued that “property remediation” in section (i)(3)(viii) should be read in conjunction with the preceding language “soil contamination” to except from the compliance plan requirement only property remediation undertaken in connection with contaminated soil, and should not include remediation that they contend amounts to “a concentrated catching-up on deferred maintenance.”
The Appellate Division agreed with the Judge Menyuk, judge of the Tax Court of New Jersey, who found that the remedial work was not simply deferred maintenance but effected physical changes at the conclusion of the remedial work that increased the value of the condominium units from the prior assessment, which reflected only partial improvements to the properties while they were in a state of ongoing remediation. Consequently, the Appellate Division affirmed that the substantial remediation of the subject properties constituted an exception to the requirement of a compliance plan stated in N.J.S.A. 54:4-23.
This Blog/Web Site is made available for educational purposes only general understanding of the law, not to provide specific legal advice. By using this blog site you understand that there is no attorney client relationship between you and the Blog/Web Site publisher.
ABD Independence v. Independence Twp.
In this case, Plaintiff, ABD Independence, Inc. (ABD), owned property in Warren County that was governed by the Highlands Water Protection and Planning Act (Highlands Act), N.J.S.A. 13:20-1 to -35. After trial, the Plaintiff appealed the value assigned to the property by Judge Kuskin, judge of the Tax Court, and argued that the value assigned by Judge Kuskin was excessive and alleged that Judge Kuskin misinterpreted statutory exemptions and thereby allowed development and regulations permitting an extension of public water to the site. The Township of Independence (the Township), cross-appealed and alleged that Judge Kuskin committed error when he found that the improvements had no value. The Appellate Division dismissed both appeals and affirmed Judge Kuskin’s findings.
The subject property in question was a 122.86 acre parcel located along Petersburg Road (Warren County Route 614) about 1200 feet north of the intersection of Petersburg Road and State Highway 46 in the Township. A substantial portion of the subject property is wooded with moderate to steep slopes. A large pond is located near Petersburg Road. A 1910 square foot farmhouse is located on the property close to Petersburg Road. The farmhouse is occupied but in disrepair. There are also miscellaneous accessory structures, such as a barn, sheds and a springhouse, on the property, all in disrepair.
On June 16, 2003, the Township planning board granted preliminary major subdivision approval to plaintiff for a thirty-nine lot clustered residential development. The project also included a single 10.056-acre parcel with the existing house and out-buildings. Each home would be served by public water and individual septic systems. The approval contained several conditions, including issuance of several permits by the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection (DEP).
The Highlands Act was adopted in August 2004, but major Highlands developments that received certain approvals and/or permits prior to March 29, 2004, were exempt from its provisions. N.J.S.A. 13:20-28a(3); N.J.A.C. 7:38-2.3(a)3. On October 18, 2004, in response to the Highlands Applicability Determination and Water Quality Management Plan Consistency Determination request filed by ABD, DEP advised ABD that the subject property is located in the Highlands Preservation Area. DEP noted that ABD had not received qualifying approvals before March 29, 2004; therefore, ABD’s proposed subdivision fell within the Major Highlands Development category, that it did not meet any of the statutory exemptions, and it would be required to obtain a Highland Preservation Area Approval before it could proceed. The Highlands Act prohibits major Highlands development within 300 feet of any Highlands open waters, i.e., 300-foot buffer, N.J.S.A. 13:20-30b(1), -32a; N.J.A.C. 7:38-3.6(a). The subject property’s existing structures fell within that buffer.
At trial, Judge Kuskin found that an addition to the residence on the property could be constructed even though the residence was within the 300 foot buffer area. Judge Kuskin interpreted N.J.S.A. 13:20-28b, which provides that the enumerated exemptions do not alter or obviate the requirements of other statutes or regulations, as not including Highlands Act requirements. Judge Kuskin reasoned that any other interpretation would render the seventeen enumerated exceptions, N.J.S.A. 13:20-28a(1) to (17), meaningless. Consequently, Judge Kuskin held that the taxpayer could renovate or construct a single family dwelling within the 300 foot buffer mandated by the Highlands Act. In so doing, Judge Kuskin rejected Plaintiff’s contention that an extension of the water line would be prohibited under N.J.A.C. 7:38-2.5(a), which prohibits “the construction of any new public water system and the extension of any existing public water system to serve development in the preservation area,” because N.J.A.C. 7:38-2.5(a) is inapplicable to a development that is “exempt from the Highlands Act pursuant to N.J.A.C. 7:38-2.3.”
The Appellate Division agreed with Judge Kuskin’s logic and affirmed the assessment that Judge Kuskin placed on the property.
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Income Producing Property w/o Income
Both of these Appellate Division opinions concerned N.J.S.A. 54:4-34, which is commonly known as “Chapter 91,” and the application of this statute’s sanction limiting a taxpayer’s right to appeal a tax assessment for failure to respond to a tax assessor’s inquiry for income and expense information.
Previously, in Conhagen, the Appellate Division held that Chapter 91′s appeal-preclusion provision applied when a taxpayer failed to respond to an assessor’s request for income and expense information, even though the subject property was not producing income at the time of the request.
Last year, however, the Appellate Division in H.J. Bailey, held that non-income-producing property is not subject to Chapter 91′s appeal limitation provision, even if the assessor’s request for income and expense information pursuant to the statute went unanswered by the taxpayer.
At issue in the recently published Tax Court case Thirty Mazel, was a property owner who did not respond to a tax assessor’s request for income and expense information who owned several apartment buildings that were formerly income-producing, but during the tax year at issue received no income, as the properties were undergoing substantial renovations.
In the published opinion, the Tax Court stated:
The gap in rent collection was occasioned not by a change in the use of the property or by owner occupancy, but because the living units had been vacated while a major renovation, presumably to enhance the future earning potential of the buildings, was undertaken. The court finds that plaintiffs never intended to abandon the income-producing nature of the properties and instead committed resources to enhancing the revenue generating potential of the properties.
As a result of the above, the Tax Court reasoned that the property owner who owned the apartments was barred by Chapter 91 from filing a tax appeal.
This reasoning in Thirty Mazel underscores the importance of responding to a tax assessor’s request for income and expense information, for even if a property does not produce any income during a relevant year, a tax appeal on such property may be barred by Chapter 91 if the tax assessor’s request is not timely answered.
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